E20a 4

Vol. XVI, No. 2 JUNE, 1957

THE REFORMED THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

S.F.T.S
LIBRARY

CONTENTS

Page

JOHN OMAN'S THEOLOGY 33
By the Rev. F. W. R. Nichol, M.A., B.D., Ph.D., Presbyterian Theological Hall, Perth, W.A.

CHRISTOLOGY AND REVELATION (III) 44
By the Rev. Professor John McIntyre, M.A., B.D., D.Litt., New College, University of Edinburgh.

BOOK REVIEWS 53
(See inside back cover)

PRICE: THREE SHILLINGS

THE REFORMED THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

EDITORS:

THE VERY REV. PRINCIPAL S. BARTON BABBAGE, M.A., Ph.D., Th.D., Melbourne.

THE REV. ROBERT SWANTON, M.A., B.D., Melbourne.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS:

THE REV. JOHN AITKEN, B.A., B.D., Bendigo, Vic.

THE REV. J. A. MUNRO FORD, B.A., B.D., Ph.D., Adelaide.

THE REV. M. W. J. GEURSEN, B.A., B.D., Melbourne.

THE VEN. ARCHDEACON T. C. HAMMOND, M.A., Th.D., Sydney.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JOHN HENDERSON, M.A., Ph.D., Dunedin.

THE REV. PROFESSOR D. S. HOPKIRK, M.A., B.D., B.Litt., Ph.D., Melbourne.

THE REV. D. BROUGHTON KNOX, B.A., B.D., M.Th., D.Phil., Sydney.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JOHN McINTYRE, M.A., B.D., D.Litt., Edinburgh.

THE REV. NEIL MacLEOD, M.A., B.D., Hamilton, Vic.

THE REV. L. L. MORRIS, B.Sc., B.D., M.Th., Ph.D., Melbourne

THE REV. PROFESSOR J. F. PETER, B.A., B.D., Dip.Ed., Brisbane.

Contributors enjoy reasonable liberty in the exposition of the Christian Faith. The Editors are not responsible for every opinion that may be expressed.

ISSUED THRICE YEARLY

Communications and Subscriptions should be forwarded to the Editors, The Manse, 304 Glenferrie Road, Hawthorn, E.2, Victoria, Australia. Subscribers in New Zealand should forward their subscriptions to the Presbyterian Bookroom, P.O. Box 389, Dunedin.

Annual Subscription:

Ten Shillings, including postage. (Foreign, 10/6.)

THE
REFORMED
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Vol. XVI, No. 2 JUNE, 1957

John Oman's Theology

John Oman's activities in what Paul Tillich calls the no-man's-land between philosophy and theology have never roused widespread interest, probably because the theological climate changed with dramatic suddenness while he was maturing his views. Carnegie Simpson, one of Oman's fellow-teachers at Westminster College, Cambridge, writes in his *Recollections*, "I remember a skit the students of the College produced in the form of a booklet with the title 'What I owe to Karl Barth, by John Oman'; the pages inside were blank!"[1] To a generation which would owe more and more to Karl Barth, Oman's theology came to have less and less appeal. Yet it is a striking fact that a writer who never knew Oman or had much contact with that stream of British theology to which he belonged; a writer who had matured within the context of continental Crisis Theology, can manifest sympathies very similar to those of Oman, and can write passages which might well have come from the pen of the Cambridge thinker. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in his *Letters and Papers from Prison,* asks, "What do we really believe? I mean, believe in such a way as to stake our whole lives upon it . . . 'What must I believe?' the wrong question . . . Barth and the Confessing Church have encouraged us to entrench ourselves behind the 'faith of the Church,' and evade the honest question, what is our real and personal belief?" And again, in his comments upon man's "coming of age," Bonhoeffer says, "God is teaching us that we must live as men who can get along very well without him."[2] The author of *Honest Religion* and *Grace and Personality* would have found here a concern very near to his own. This at any rate suggests that Oman was dealing with themes that theology cannot afford to neglect, and it may be that he has something of value to contribute to the contemporary theological debate.

Perhaps the most suitable starting point in an exposition of Oman's contribution is with the problem of

1. P. Carnegie Simpson, Recollections, Nisbet (1943), p. 65.
2. D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison S.C.M. (1943), pp. 179-80, 164.

authority. This was, at any rate, the immediate cause of the peculiar direction which his thought took. In the Introduction to *Vision and Authority* he writes of his reaction as a student and young minister to the attitude of many ecclesiastics to the Robertson Smith case in Scotland, and tells us of his vow at that time to find an adequate resting place for religious authority, a resting place which would support the religious man in his freedom to follow his conscience wherever it might lead him. The problem assumed the proportions it did for two main reasons. On the one hand, Biblical criticism had apparently undermined the authority of Scripture to such an extent that it seemed to have lost its power to speak except possibly to the erudition of scholars. But this had never been the real position of the Bible in the Church, certainly not in the Churches of the Reformation. The nature of the Bible's authority must, Oman considered, be reinterpreted if it is to be regained. One must strike below the literalistic, externalised approach which had been taken for granted for so long, and seek the real authority of which this was only the outer shell.

Further, the Church itself provided a problem. That it should be able to appeal to men with a moving power seemed self-evident, yet it was plainly not accomplishing this task by the mere reiteration of orthodox formulas or by the conventional application of an individualistic conversionism. The Church needed both a wider view of its work than that of plucking brands from the burning, and a deeper understanding of the nature of its peculiar task, an understanding which would enable her to share creatively in the meaning of man's struggle. Among the supporters of the Oxford Movement Oman discerned an archaism, a mystical retreat from the problems with which the ordinary member of the Church and of society was having to wrestle. The collapse of Christendom was bringing about a panic situation, and this return to the past, this yearning for a lost unity of spiritual life, was a reaction characteristic of humanity's perennial unwillingness to assume the problems of freedom and change. Among Evangelicals the same pattern was evident in the cry for the "old Gospel" that had stirred earlier generations. The lack of, and general desire for, unity within the Church was frequently an expression of this nostalgia: a unified Church would regain its old prestige in society, and would be able to guide men out of the perplexities which seemed about to overwhelm them.

Oman realised that if we are to reinterpret the function of the Church and restate the claims of the Gospel in a way appropriate to our contemporaries, it is of little use to concern ourselves with peripheral questions. We must go the heart of the difficulty, and reconsider the nature of God's purpose with man, and therefore the nature of God Himself. This may seem obvious enough, but Oman went further: he saw that this implied a renewed understanding of the doctrine of grace. British theology of his time was characteristically concerned with the doctrine of the Atonement: it was Oman's special contribution to find the point at issue to be the doctrine of grace. This, he claimed, must first be considered and settled before any attempt is made to construct an adequate doctrine of the Atonement or any other doctrine.

And consideration of the nature of authority and of grace must be related, in Oman's view, to the question of freedom. And in speaking as much as he did about freedom, Oman showed himself well aware of the tendencies and interests of his time, the questions implicit in his own situation. The mid-nineteeneth century had seen the attempts of the industrial worker to throw off the rule of the middle class. In Europe this had been more violent than in Britain. 1848, although a year of abortive revolution, marks the beginning of a period in which Marxism steadily gained ground. And in England, too, Chartists and Labour Party witnessed to a desire for a less external form of state authority, and the right of men to govern themselves was to be increasingly recognised.

Oman saw all this ferment in social life and read in it the prolongation of the ideas of the Renascence and especially of the Enlightenment, and with these he sympathised profoundly, for they marked man's "coming of age," his right to order his own existence among his fellows. Yet, at the same time, Oman was equally aware of the dangers. He was deeply aware of the meaning of culture, and he feared that amid all this reaction from merely external authority there was a grave danger that much of the richness of human life and the gains of civilisation and history would be lost. The values most worthy of man's effort were being completely overlooked in favour of a supposedly superior technical advance. Man's conception of God embodied all the deposit of his historic converse with reality, and at the same time called him to deeper understanding of his world and freer participation in it — but religious belief of this sort did not seem to be necessary to bring in a scientific and technical Utopia.

Oman, and many like him, felt the shallowness of this mood. His problem was, then, to find an understanding of freedom which would be adequate to the needs of the time as they sprang from social, economic and especially religious change, and which would also offer the possibility of preserving the depth of culture and meaning in civilised life which the nineteenth century had glimpsed. Somehow, two conceptions of freedom had to be reconciled: that of the Enlightenment, which understood freedom as *independence* from all merely external authority, however good; and that of the Romantic period, to whose leading spirits freedom was rather *fulfilment*, complete participation in the depth and richness of existence. An idea of God's purpose with man was needed such as would knit these two together, an "organic spiritual interpretation" of human existence which would give his contemporaries power to cope creatively with the centrifugal forces which surrounded them, and so enter more fully into the meaning of life. Oman believed that his view of God as a gracious Father seeking from men independent and responsible sonship did provide such an interpretation.

We find Oman at work on the core of his problem in the earliest of his published works — the translation of and introduction to Schleiermacher's *Reden*, published in 1893. For it is indeed Schleiermacher who sets the problem for nineteenth century theology. Oman, perhaps more clearly than any other in Britain, saw the importance of Schleiermacher's "Schlechthinigeabhängigkeitgefühl," consciousness of being absolutely dependent, as a cognitive act, an organic spiritual interpretation. He consistently refused to be led into an understanding of this as merely emotion, as "feeling," in which terms Schleiermacher has been largely misunderstood in British theology in spite of great dependence upon him. But Oman also saw that Schleiermacher lacked, in his somewhat aesthetic, contemplative view of this cognitive act, a sufficiently personal understanding of it, by means of which it could be more directly related to the person of Christ. Here Ritschlianism, the dominant theological influence in the latter years of the century, exhibited a firmer resolve to centre theology on Christ Himself; and in Herrmann there appeared a new appreciation of the Person of Christ as demanding obedience, requiring discipleship in personal encounter. God, as Schleiermacher seemed to understand Him, could as well be revealed without Christianity as within it, but a Ritschlian reinterpretation seemed to offer more hope of centering full and final revelation in a Person, interpreting

the nature and character of God to persons and specifically for their life as persons.

This brings us back to the core of Oman's religious thought, to the doctrine of grace itself, and it must be claimed for him that in making a distinctive contribution at this point, he will have a lasting effect upon British theological thought. It was undoubtedly with this in mind that F. R. Tennant spoke of *Grace and Personality* as a "major treasure of theological literature." For Oman made it clear once and for all that God's action upon man must be thought of in personal terms, and that, however useful impersonal analogies and manners of speech about grace as a force may be, it must never be forgotten that the heart of God's dealing with us is in His relation to us as the Father to His beloved children. Too often theology has neglected this central truth, and Oman brought a just criticism of Protestant scholasticism to bear from this angle. Whatever may have been the original intention of Calvin in his *Institutes*, the section on the freedom of man's will always leaves the impression that God simply bends the will of man wheresoever He pleases, controlling him as a man controls the horse he rides. Oman saw beyond this Islamic conception of God's sovereignty to a deeper understanding of the Biblical view of God's commerce with man, and was able to formulate a doctrine of the prevenience of God's grace which left untouched man's real self-determination. As Barth has more recently expressed it, God's activity is that of a "grand seigneur" ordering and adapting his action with respect to his world with infinite patience and spontaniety, and is not a once-for-all decree promulgated in the deep recesses of eternity and applied legalistically to individual cases.

But Oman did not leave the matter there. For he also asserted unmistakeably that grace is only properly understood if it is conceived as having its own proper direction, *downwards* from God to man. There must never be, in considering the nature of God's saving activity, any suggestion that God is unwilling to impart His forgiveness. The whole work must come freely and unreservedly from Him, if we are to interpret the New Testament rightly. Yet the idea that God must be in some sense placated before He will forgive is never very far from the understanding of the Atonement which stems from the Reformers, and this is the reason for Oman's unreserved rejection of a substitutionary theory. He recognised a value in such theories in so far as they witnessed to a need that no mere moral influence theory could satisfy: forgiving cannot be under-

stood as merely condoning, and it is the awareness of this, Oman thinks, that creates substitutionary theories. God's grace must be understood as a gracious personal relationship in the power of which we are able to see and accept ourselves for what, in all our sin, we are. But this is only possible when we also know God as sharing with us the shame and ignominy of our sins, and assuring us that they no longer stand between us and Him.

This personal understanding of God's relation to man is thus a valid boundary of all discussion of a theological doctrine of grace, and Oman must be given the credit for asserting it in unequivocal terms, and, moreover, for so doing long before it becomes a commonplace through the influence of Buber, Heim and Macmurray.

Oman further gives to his personalism a clearer and more explicitly ethical content than it sometimes achieves in later writers, in whom it is not always clear that they have succeeded in avoiding the impression that the reality man meets in religion is anything more than a "vague supernatural potency." They tend to lose the personal in the mystical, the reality and the explicitness of the meeting in their insistence upon the "otherness" of the divine "Thou." Oman is sharply aware that God has revealed Himself, has spoken a Word which comes to us in the particular and the concrete.

But this observation is already leading us, as Oman would wish it to do, from an understanding of God as personal to the understanding of man's response to Him as personal.

Oman was insistent that no particular faculty of man should be regarded as the exclusive channel of his religious experience. On the contrary, the whole of his being is involved, not in the sense that he can be religious only in so far as he is a unified, harmonious personality, but in the sense that, in making ethical decisions and acting upon them in the power of grace, he risks his whole personal existence in a decision made only in faith. Faith for Oman was certainly not security in the sense that it has a rationalised and certain knowledge, demonstrable to all comers, of the ways of God in the world and the explicit duty of man. Faith is rather a glimpse of the eternal purpose in some concrete situation, an awareness of a concrete demand; and this awareness is, at the same time, an intuitive evaluative knowing, an interpretation of the meaning of one's existence. This interpretation is not something given to man from without, so that he is resolved from responsibility for it as his own decision. On the

contrary, it is something that he must himself make: he must actively and creatively seek out his duty, always reaching out into the world of personal relations and deciding to act now in this way, now in that, as he sees fit, conscious that, in thus asserting and claiming his freedom, he is upheld in the partiality and finiteness of his vision by the power of God Who seeks to confer upon him this very independence.

Perhaps it is in this conception of the nature of man's moral and religious life that Oman made his most striking contribution, both in his own time and ours. To him it was quite clear that philosophy and theology, far from being activities of a static reality "out there," are really on all fours with the simplest and most homespun thoughts of every man as he seeks to deal adequately with the situations which confront him, situations which change and develop in an alarming and disconcerting way, and which call upon him for an ever-renewed understanding of himself and courageous action on the basis of it. Philosophical and theological systems are useful as a summary of man's past experience, but "we have to use our charts as far as they serve, but our own task only begins where they fail."[3] Such systems are simply more complex and sophisticated versions of this attempt on man's part to understand himself. One might not unjustly suggest that a renewed apprehension of this contribution of Oman's might do much to invigorate British theological thought, which is in danger of a traditionalism or a theological positivism.

The basic elements of Oman's religious thought may, then, be stated as follows: First, God has created man a free, responsible moral personality, called to live a full life of sonship in faith. This element of truth Oman believed to be the contribution of the Enlightenment, with its belief in man's "coming of age." And, secondly, God is active in the world, fostering this very independence which He intends for man, for the world is, as Oman's successor, H. H. Farmer has expressed it, God's "symbol,"[4] by means of which He challenges and calls man to his high destiny of sonship. The inner meaning of God's work in the world, the clue to its heart, is to be seen in the perfect obedience and faith of Jesus Christ. To state Oman's position so baldly is, of course, to do him less than justice, and to leave out of our discussion much that is most absorbing and acute in his writings — his classification of religions in *The Natural and the Supernatural* into Primitive, Poly-

3. **Honest Religion**, Macmillan, 1941, p. 41.
4. H. H. Farmer, **The World and God**, Nisbet, Chapter IV.

theistic, Mystical, Ceremonial-Legal and Prophetic, and his careful exposition of the way in which, through these forms of his religion, man expresses his relation to that which concerns him ultimately, sometimes positively, sometimes negatively; or his discussion of the nature and development of the Church in *The Church and the Divine Order* and *Vision and Authority,* a treatment which, at a much earlier date, points forward to Emil Brunner's views in *The Misunderstanding of the Church;* or, again, his discussions of the nature of knowledge, especially of that of the child and the poet, in *The Natural and the Supernatural,* some passages of which are both moving and penetrating. But in an essay of this kind, one must be content with remarking that he develops his view with great detail and acuteness. And the essential points of his view of religion are outlined above.

One comes very close to patronising in observing that Oman was unfortunate enough to stand at the end of a theological era which was soon to pass away, an era primarily concerned with such problems as the relation of religion to science, of religion to general epistemology, of the specific life of the Christian society to that of general society, an era primarily concerned with apologetic questions. Interest has since swung sharply away from such problems to a consideration of the actual content of the Christian message, from an apologetic theology to what Tillich calls "kerygmatic" theology. The free, unexpected mercy of God in revelation and grace has come to be underlined in a way not to be found in the theology of Oman's time, and his own work suffers from lack of this insight.

This inadequacy becomes apparent if we take three moments of Christian belief and compare Oman's treatment of them with a treatment which would begin with God in His free grace in Christ: creation, miracle and prayer.

With regard to Oman's view of creation, we may ask, Is it really the case that the Bible really understands God's relation to the world in the sense that Oman presents it? In his mind, the world is the plastic instrument by means of which God, in His infinite patience and care for the human person, teaches him the lessons of his independence. But the Creation is not, in biblical understanding, that by which God speaks to man. This He does in His Word, in which He reveals Himself as the Creator. The Bible speaks of the Creation rather as a witness to God's freedom and unconditionedness. To say that the world is God's Creation

is not to make a statement about the world and its power to reveal God, but to witness to the nature of God Himself, to declare an inalienable attribute of His Godhead, and to accord to Him the power to reveal Himself wheresoever He pleases.

The problem of miracle is one that is not discussed in Oman's works at all, and this fact in itself should give us pause to think about the whole basis of his thought. For miracle is clearly very closely associated with the content of the "kerygma," and any attempt to formulate a Christian system of thought must give some account of it. One feels, however, that his great stress on the independence of man rules out from the beginning the possibility of giving such an account, for would not any miraculous act of God's part amount to a denial of the principle that man is able to, and must, grasp the truth of God by his own insight and consecration? But the Biblical miracles witness to the hopelessness of man's position under the powers of darkness and sin, a hopelessness that can only be turned to joy when God, out of His unmerited and miraculous mercy, intervenes and reveals Himself as his Redeemer and Justifier. Man, for all his consecration, does not know such a God apart from the miracle of revelation, and can only speak of His appearing in terms of miracle.

Oman's account of prayer is most interesting and persuasive. He places petitionary prayer at the very centre of prayer life, as the sharpest and truest expression of a faith in God which knows Him as personal, and in so doing he is consciously differing from views of prayer which understand it as primarily contemplative and mystical. Personality rightly conceived is concerned with concrete tasks in this world, and with its needs in relation to them: thus petitionary prayer reveals and is necessitated by a right relation between divine and human persons. It is not enough to state that God knows all our needs and is more ready to hear us than we to pray, and to conclude from this that petitionary prayer belongs only to the periphery of the life of prayer. The truth of the matter is, says Oman, that God waits for our sincere and earnest requests before He will bestow His gifts. What is most important is that we should desire them rightly, "Earnestly desiring the best gifts" (1 Cor. 12:31). "Prayer is not bombarding God for acts of omnipotence which, otherwise, He might withhold, but it is the intercourse of the family of God. . . . We need God's help to receive with profit, and not because God forgets to be gracious till he is urged" (*Grace and Personality*, p. 170). "As a father, God gives in

the way that would make us most his children in freedom and power" (*Honest Religion*, p. 80).

All this is impressive, but in the attempt to give a more "gracious" understanding of the idea of prayer, has not Oman really done away with the actual character of grace as a free and unconditioned gift? Has he not rationalised the New Testament command that we should pray and not faint on the basis of his personalist principle? God, he maintains, desires us to pray so that we may receive aright the good things of His providence. He knows that God is always at hand, always available, always ready to give, and that He does give, even to those who do not ask. But, if God's grace is free and unmerited, can we, as sinful human beings, so confidently assume any such thing? Should we not rather assume the precise opposite? According to the Gospel parable, prayer is the cry of the importunate woman at the door of the judge to whose attention she has no right whatever, the desperate appeal of the sinner who dares to believe, through the miracle of Christ and His Cross, that God may hear him. Through the word of the Cross alone, and not through a rationalised principle of God's Fatherhood and man's sonship, we can assume that God will be and is our Creator, Provider and Redeemer, and prayer is the appropriate human response to the miracle of His revelation of Himself in this role to the sinful and the rebellious. Why God should be what He is to us is something we can never understand or explain, for it remains a mystery of His grace in Christ. But Oman does know why, and finds the reason in the inherent worth of man's possibilities in independence.

It is clear from these three instances that, for all Oman's desire to avoid a "system," the freedom of God has been obscured by a rationalism which revolves around the inviolateness of man's autonomy. The problem of reconciliation exists only for God — how can He get man to see that He is, in fact, always gracious? But surely in the New Testament the boot is wholly on the other foot; God is not, there, the servant of man's autonomy; rather the matter for wonder is what God has chosen to do with *His* freedom, and does choose to do. God does in fact speak to men His word of judgment and forgiveness in Christ; to these incredible facts the Church witnesses. And this Word is a genuine word of *revelation*. For Oman the Word of God is not merely a word which man may speak to himself, but which he *must* speak to himself. It is not, strictly speaking, a revelation of what man is and Who God is, a speaking *to* man from a position which he could never

conceivably occupy, but is an intramundane insight into his relations with a Being Who lives ultimately on the same level as himself. Thus Jesus, simply by the perfection of his human life, manifests the essential personality of God. But if God is God and not man, can He be revealed in a human life as such? Does humanity, infinitely extended in the direction of its own inherent goodness, bring us one iota nearer Godhead? It it does, there is no essential miracle, no paradox about the Incarnation, no confrontation of man by Another wholly incommensurate with himself, the Lord and Determiner of his existence. (It may be noted here that Oman finds, in the Christological statements of the New Testament and of the ancient Church, little more than mystical and metaphysical speculations.) And, it may further be asked, is *man* revealed on such terms? Is not the perverse man every bit as real as was the Perfect Man of Galilee. Man is really revealed as man when he is revealed as standing before God, and not simply as he himself sees himself, even in the highest flights of religious intuition. These are two radically different points of view, and all of Oman's insistence that truth is not ours until we see it of our own insight cannot dull the edge of this distinction. God, if He is indeed to be known as God, must speak a Word to man which man cannot and dare not speak to himself.

Earlier we had occasion to observe that Oman's understanding of theology as an expression of man's self-understanding with a view to concrete activity within the world, his idea of moral action involving a daring "organic spiritual interpretation" of the meaning of existence, could be his chief contribution to the thought of his time and of ours. But here we must note a proviso when we make this judgment, for Oman did not see clearly enough that a Christian's understanding of himself in the light of God's Word in Christ is not commensurable with an understanding of human existence worked out beyond the "theological circle" of the believing Church. Simply because the one hears, in faith, who he is *before God*, he is in a very different position from the other who does not begin from God in His revelation. In Oman the philosophical and theological circles are never distinguished. In spite of his great desire to avoid the charge by insisting upon the practical character and goal of theology, Oman drifts into a species of gnosticism, a speculative rational-intuitive apprehension of the meaning of things, in which man's understanding of his own existence is transformed into revelation. The Church's theology, however, does not make

any such claims; it is concerned to exist only as an act of obedience, of keeping the Church's contemporary language true to the original apostolic witness to God's saving act in Christ. Although it may often speak in terms of this philosophy or that, it is not bound to them as interpretations of existence, but simply uses them to bring out the depth and nature of the significance of Jesus Christ. In their Christological statements the New Testament and the ancient divines were not doing metaphysics; they were presenting the content of the Gospel, examining and crystallising its presentation within the Church, and calling upon the whole household of faith to strive with them for its purity. Oman's conception of theology would set it alongside other interpretations of human existence, condemned to the same ultimate relativity. But if its subject is God's free and merciful Word to man in Christ, this is simply impossible.

But in conclusion we may say that, provided the limitations of theology are observed, Oman has much to tell us about "Honest Religion," for as Christian religious thinkers we do think "existentially" under the message which God has spoken to us. Our freedom as sons in the Holy Spirit does mean that we must wrestle for our own account, in contemporary language, of the meaning of Christ, and of the meaning of our existence in Him. Unless we do so wrestle, our theology is simply speculation and theory. It is easy to turn out the ecclesiastically correct phrase, the fashionable jargon, but it is quite another matter to struggle with these things in an attempt to offer our whole existence as a holy and living sacrifice in response to God's life-giving Word. It was this to which Oman tried to point us in his conception of "honest religion," and, though he fell foul of the pitfalls of his time, we would do well to hear him yet.

F. W. R. NICHOL.

Christology and Revelation

(Continued from Vol. XVI, No. 1, p. 20)

B. *EMIL BRUNNER*

In complete antithesis to Fairweather's assertion we select next the opening words of Brunner's *Mediator;* page 21, "Through God alone can God be known." He adds "this is a principle common to all religion." The opposition to Fairweather is obvious at the outset. Fairweather has just been observed to say in effect that it is through the other-than-God that God is known. Two questions immedi-

ately suggest themselves to us:—

(1) Is Brunner's assertion entirely false?

(2) Is there any ground upon which we can reconcile the two points of view?

1. Let us first discover what Brunner means by his assertion. Several possibilities suggest themselves.

(a) The first is one which neo-orthodox theologians might contemplate but it is not foremost in Brunner's mind in this part of his work. The statement could represent a denial of man's ability to apprehend God by virtue of any inherent power to apprehend revelation. It is only through God working within the corrupt degenerate *imago dei*, re-creating it, making it responsive, that man apprehends God. In other words, in terms of our symbolism, Brunner is emphasising the IG in "x(A) reveals y(B) to C/IG." While Brunner would not deny the necessity of indwelling grace for the apprehension of God it is unlikely that he is here laying that emphasis.

(b) The second possibility might be generally stated in these terms:—It is only as God chooses or decides to reveal Himself that he is known by man. The situation then would amount to a denial of natural theology. For natural theology Brunner would substitute the concept of general revelation. When man thinks that by contemplation of the natural world he has arrived inductively at the idea of God, he has done so really not by any power of argumentation at all, but because God has revealed Himself in the situation from which the seeming argumentation began. In other words all theology, as all religion, deals with theophanies, with self-revelations of God. He would then distinguish Christianity from other religions not by the fact that it concerns itself with revelation while the others do not, but by the characteristics which it ascribes to its revelation. The first is that it asserts the uniqueness of this revelation, its unrepeatable character, in virtue of which what happened in Jesus Christ cannot happen again. It deals with the most special of special revelation. The second characteristic which Brunner would ascribe to Christian revelation would be its rootedness in the historical. This feature is the ground of its uniqueness: in Jesus Christ are to be found certain elements which are not to be repeated because they are conjoined with a historical personality. If then Brunner only means that it is through God's decision to be known, and not through any native power of man to find God, that God is known we should agree, but add that while giving us the *fons et origo* of revelation he has not described to us its nature.

(c) The former account scarcely contains all that is in Brunner's mind however. The rest of what he intends may be brought out more exactly through the use of our formulae. "x(A) reveals y(B) to C." He is actually saying then that it is only because y(B) is present in the situation that revelation takes places. God (i.e. B) as characterised by y, which is synthetically apprehended together with x(A), is the necessary if not the sufficient condition of revelation. Through y(B), albeit conjoined with x(A), is B alone known. If we take the formula "x(A) reveals AB to C" the same analysis holds. It is not through the historical Jesus [x(A)] but through God incarnate (AB) that God is known. Again through AB is B known. That is, through God (as characterised by y or as incarnate in A) is God known.

Of this analysis of Brunner's statement we can say that it has certainly emphasised what Fairweather omitted, that in revelation it is *God* who is known, but we must disagree with his use of the phrase "through God." He seems to have confused x(A) with y(B) and AB: God (as characterised by y and incarnate in A) falls on the side of that which is revealed, that is within y(B) and AB, not on the side of that through which or whom God is revealing Himself, x(A). Thus we are forced to conclude that not only is Brunner's an incomplete statement of the nature of revelation but also that by its over-simplification it has relieved the author of a very difficult task when he comes to the specifically Christological statement of relating x(A) to AB and AB to EB: by this legerdemain he has ruled out a priori all kenotic theories which attempt to solve the vexed question of the relations of x(A) to AB and AB to EB.

(d) There is a fourth possibility in the interpretation of Brunner's statement, but we shall consider it when we come to discuss a near-identical assertion of Barth's. (See below C.1.)

2. The answer to our second question, that of reconciling the contradiction of Brunner and Fairweather, must now be evident. The contradiction arises in the main because of their emphasis on different parts of the situation of revelation. Brunner as interpreted in 1(b) has drawn attention to the fact that it is through God's act that revelation is initiated and that through revelation He is known. In so doing his analysis has been faulty through his failure to take account of the part played by the other-than-God in the situation. Fairweather on the other hand has truly stated that God reveals Himself through

what is not Himself, but curiously denied that the understanding is directed to God in revelation. That is, Brunner emphasises y(B) at the expense of x(A), and Fairweather commits the reverse error.

C. *KARL BARTH*

Two quotations from Barth will take us further on the way to understanding the contemporary significance of our formula.

(1) *Doctrine of the Word of God*, Part 1, p.340: "God reveals Himself through Himself." If there may have been some ambiguity in Brunner's statement which is practically identical with this quotation from Barth, there is none here. By his previous and succeeding statements, namely "*God* reveals Himself" and "God reveals *Himself*," Barth shows exactly what he means. He is speaking of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The significance of our original quotation is that it is through the divine, through the essential God in Jesus Christ, that revelation occurs. In other words Barth has said that our F2 "AB reveals EB (to C)" is a complete description of the revelation situation. He might restate the formula in this way "B reveals EB to C," but the significance would still be fundamentally the same. He has omitted our F1 "x(A) reveals AB to C." This omission leads to the much-criticised Barthian unconcern about the historical Jesus, x(A). A further fault in Barth's analysis is that he omits from his analysis all reference to C, and consequently that analysis is incomplete.

(2) The criticism just passed upon Barth's statement on p.340 throws light upon the subsequent assertion on p.351, "God reveals Himself as the Lord." (An assertion which he equates on p.353 with "the revelation attested by Scripture.") This statement is to be regarded as an analytical judgment. The distinction between form and content cannot be applied to the Biblical concept of revelation. By way of comment we may say:—

(a) Barth here confirms our previous judgment that when he speaks of revelation he is thinking only of that part of it which we have described by F2, "AB reveals EB (to C)."

By saying that his revelation statement is an analytical judgment he intends that there is equality of content in subject and in predicate, in AB and EB, that is, that AB is identical with EB, that in knowing AB we *ipso facto* know the whole of EB.

By adding that the distinction between form and content cannot be applied to the Biblical concept of

revelation he intends not that the form of B's existence in AB is the same as in EB for that would be patent nonsense, but that despite difference of form the content is substantially or consubstantially the same. He issues this caveat because in the case of other existents form and content are mutually conditioned and difference of form does imply difference of content. If this general truth is held in regard to revelation then we should have to doubt, Barth feels, whether in knowing AB we also know EB.

In the main Barth seems to be correct here, but he ought to safeguard his statement against one misinterpretation: it might be thought that by an examination of AB the mind automatically recognises it to be equivalent to EB; compare: if we know what is meant by the term "triangle" we automatically know that it is a plane rectilinear figure bounded by three sides. In the proposition "AB reveals EB to C" however, it is only as it is given to C in faith to make the identification, that is, it is only by revelation that we can say that the judgment is analytical. If Barth wishes to say that AB is identical with EB he ought first of all to say that back of this analytical judgment is a synthetic one, containing the word revelation, our F2. Alternatively he should say that his revelation judgment is an analytical a posteriori judgment.

(b) In his statement quoted Barth with his emphasis on its analytical character has shown how completely he has neglected F1 in his description of the Biblical concept of revelation. We have already emphasised the synthetic character of the Formula "x(A) reveals y(B) to C," a synthetic character present also in F1. To say that these formulae of revelation are analytical would be nonsense, for it would imply that any unbeliever by examination of x(A), whether the firmament or the historical life of Jesus, is thereby without any faith confronted by God.

(c) We cannot therefore avoid the conclusion that Barth's analysis is very partial, e.g., he neglects the historical situation which is the basis of the occurrence of revelation. His emphasis on God's revealing Himself through Himself indicates this neglect. He does not appreciate the non-analytical character of the identification of God as incarnate in Jesus Christ with the essence of God. He does not by the omission of the place of the believer in the revelation situation do justice to the triadic character of the relationship. Accordingly we must say that Barth's analysis of revelation is an example of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness, the fallacy of regarding the description of an abstraction from a situation as a

description of the total situation. Barth succumbs to this fallacy for two understandable reasons. On the one hand he is anxious to safeguard the divine origin of revelation, and not to allow it to become a man-made construction from creaturely entities. On the other hand by emphasising the consubstantiality of Christ with God he wishes to ensure the completeness and adequacy of revelation in Jesus Christ as against all attempts to discover progressive revelation beyond Christ or to find in Christ less than in God Himself. Understandable as these reasons are it is doubtful whether they justify Barth's simplification of the revelation situation.

D. *GUNTHER DEHN*

A final illustration of the use of our formulae for the analysis of contemporary statements on revelation is taken from Gunther Dehn, *Man and Revelation.* Dehn represents a modern Lutheran position. In the Chapter entitled "God hidden even when Revealed: The Hidden God"; p.65, "God is concealed even in His revelation . . . even among Christians there is a continual desire to get into contact with God directly in His revelation"; p.66: "But God resists this desire by remaining always, even in his revelation, the hidden God . . . God becomes man . . . God's activity is interwoven with the events of human history (and . . . it) is not directly distinguishable from the history of mankind." This Lutheran viewpoint is a more striking example of Fairweather's position that God is made manifest through the other-than-God. Dehn sharpens his description of the situation by showing how this other-than-God so far from automatically revealing God more naturally conceals Him. When we stumble upon Jesus Christ's life and death in history we tend to regard them as of one piece, or homogeneous with, the rest of human history. The marvel is that in spite of this involvement of Christ in historical process we should be given to apprehend Him as the revelation of God. Dehn is almost saying that it is not because of a man that is called Jesus but rather in spite of a man that is called Jesus that God is revealed to mankind. The x(A) is to ordinary empirical inspection so exactly like A that it appears impossible for man to go beyond it, or to see within it y(B) or AB. A hides B. Still it is through x(A) and not ultimately in spite of A that C apprehends y(B) or AB and because of this fact we cannot concur with Dehn in his earlier contention that God resists the desire of Christians to get into contact directly with Him in revelation. By "directly" Dehn of course

means unmediated immediacy, but surely the use of the term "revelation" implies that the immediacy, the directness, is mediated and there must take place contact with God or else revelation is finally deceptive.

1. We may be tempted in view of the difficulties to have done with the Chalcedonian Christology, and to say that we have in Jesus Christ one who is as we are, all human, and to add that even in the ordinary human there is present the divine. In other words we might attempt to solve the Chalcedon difficulties by holding that every human being is God-man and a locus of incarnation. This seemingly simple escape from Chalcedon is scarcely patient of even the mildest scrutiny, for let us be honest about what such escape involves. It involves a transfer of all the Chalcedonian difficulties about Jesus Christ to every human being. It substitutes a Chalcedonian man for a Chalcedonian Jesus Christ; as we asked of Jesus Christ how is the human nature related to the divine? Which is the proper subject of the divine and human attributes? so if we are going to bring any thought at all to such a venture in Christological enquiry we must ask exactly the same questions about man, or precisely about individual men. Once we ask such questions we are inevitably led into all the discussions which have ranged around the Chalcedonian formula.

2. Perhaps the most satisfactory way of dealing with the Chalcedonian formula is to set it in relation not to its historical antecedents or consequents but to the actual situation which it was claiming to describe, namely the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. If we set it in this relation our task shall not be that of advancing beyond Chalcedon to some modern symbol (creed), but of advancing to Chalcedon from that in which Chalcedon has its base. In the revelation situation described by F1 and F2, x(A) reveals AB to C, and AB reveals EB to C, we have set down in symbolic form the fact that for the believer God is really present in his fulness in the man Jesus. In other words, for faith Jesus Christ is both man and God. If we bring our previous analysis of revelation to bear upon this situation we may say that the relation between the human and the divine in Jesus Christ is the unique revelational relation, that is the divine is apocalyptically present while the human is actually and empirically present. The latter is inspectable by the secular historian who can without Christian faith examine the historical details of a life lived in Palestine 2,000 years ago. The synthetic union of the divine with this human and inspectable life is only apprehended insofar as in faith the Christian believer

sees that life as at the same time being the revelation of God. For the believer then Jesus Christ is at once God and man; He is at once the subject of the perfect human nature and the subject of the divine nature revealed therein. Chalcedon has said that the two natures co-exist; its faulty relating of each to the one person has led into the by-paths of anhypostasia and enhypostasia. The revelation concept is the clue to the relation of the two; it allows for the completely human, if perfectly human, development of Jesus Christ in will, consciousness and obedience. But it emphasises also the essentially divine, synthetically, revelationally but nonetheless really, united with the human. It allows to Christ a manhood which is of one substance with the manhood in us, but it assigns to Him deity of one substance with the Godhead, deity which is synthetically apprehended together with the manhood; consequently not separate altogether from, nor confused with, the latter. On this position we may make the following comments for purposes of elucidation:—

(a) It makes possible the assertion which kenoticism would forbid, namely, that the fulness of Godhead is present in Jesus Christ. Kenoticism attempted to solve, but never succeeded in doing so, the problem of how divinity could be confined within the limits of manhood; it was obliged consequently to postulate complete depotentiation of the Logos, thereby endangering the continuity and identity of the divine in Jesus Christ with the preexistent Logos. On our view there is no attempt made to depotentiate the Logos, for we have held that it is the essentially unique element of revelation that God should reveal Himself in and through what is less than God, and that He should in the case of Jesus Christ so reveal Himself that the medium of revelation is the complete bearer of the Godhead.

This presence of the fulness of the Godhead revelationally in Jesus Christ is the justification of the worship which faith offers to Him.

It is, too, the ground upon which Jesus Christ offers to us the gift of God Himself, and makes the demands which God alone can make.

It is the basis further of such an assertion which faith alone can make as that made by the Fourth Evangelist, "We have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father" (Jn. 1:14). It is this presence in Christ of the fulness of the Godhead which obliges the Christian to seek further knowledge of God nowhere else than in Christ.

(b) The view here advanced enables us to deal with the difficulty which we felt when we discussed Barth's identification of AB with EB; we saw then that Barth was attempting to say "AB is identical with EB"; we can now say that the statement "Jesus Christ is God" depends for its truth upon the meaning of "is." Our previous discussion of Barth's statement showed that the "is" is not the "is" of complete identity. Nor can we say that the "is" is the "is" of mere predication; we do not mean only that Jesus Christ is "divine," using the term "divine" in the sense of God-like, as we might us it of human nature in general, basing our view of human nature on a non-Barthian analysis of the *imago dei.* For the believer, God in His fulness is apocalyptically present in Jesus Christ, so that the believer in apprehending the man Jesus synthetically apprehends God as present in Him and consequently in this Incarnation apprehends again synthetically the essence of God.

Because of this synthetic character of the "is," the believer can only advance his knowledge of God through more thorough understanding of the man Jesus; at no point can he cast loose from that historic factor in the synthesis and embark on mystical flights.

Because of this synthesis also Christian theology must ever remain Biblical theology and must ever take account of the fruits of Biblical criticism. Equally, Biblical criticism, if it forgets the synthesis, forgets, that is, the theological factor which is for faith indissolubly bound to the historical, will lapse into mere literary criticism.

(c) This view moreover offers a solution to the problem of the nature of the knowledge of Jesus Christ. The consciousness of Jesus Christ we should say was perfectly human, and humanly perfect; He was not the possessor of two separated streams of consciousness, the one omniscient and the other defective and ignorant. This human consciousness which possesses that unity which we observe throughout the New Testament records was not simply human however; it revealed the divine consciousness, will and purpose, not as realities empirically present for all and sundry alike, but synthetically presented to the believer who apprehended them together with their human media. When we ask the question then, did Jesus Christ know the theorems of thermodynamics? we cannot answer it because the question is based on wrong premises. To answer it we should have to assume either that Jesus Christ was totally human, in which case we would reply that He did not, or that Jesus Christ was univocally human and divine, in

which case our reply would be that He both knew and did not know these theorems. On our view we agree with neither of these premises and accordingly give neither of the answers; but we can I believe solve the problem which the question is trying to raise by saying that the mind of the man Jesus which did not know the theorems of thermodynamics reveals to us a mind which does know them, a mind which is therefore revelationally present to us in our apprehension of the man Jesus.

JOHN McINTYRE.

Book Reviews

THE TRIUMPH OF GRACE IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH
By G. C. Berkouwer (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishings Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, U.S.A.), 1956, pp. 414; $4.95.

It gives me special pleasure to review this study of my tutor and professor, Dr. G. C. Berkouwer, of the Free University in Amsterdam. More than two years ago I read this book in the Dutch publication, but I feel no regret for having read it again. It is a very valuable work and I can fully understand why this book has been translated into English and is also being translated into German. It is no doubt one of the most careful analyses and investigations of Barth's extensive body of work. Barth's writings are not easy to comprehend, with the result that there is much misunderstanding concerning his opinions. An obvious example of this is the well-known study of Prof. C. Van Til, of Westminster Seminary, Philadelphia, entitled: "The New Modernism." In a special appendix Berkouwer deals with the method of Van Til and criticises it. In that same connection he gives us an insight into his own approach to the matter, when he wrties: "It is my idea that the criticism of Barth's theology and the objections to it can have importance in the responsible discussion of our time only, if they are based upon a legitimate and warranted analysis of his work" (p. 384). That he has succeeded in this design appears very clearly from the fact that Barth himself mentions this study in the preface of his Church Dogmatics IV., 2 (1955)), as a specimen of correct rendering of his standpoint (geschrieben mit Sorgfalt, Gutwilligkeit und christlicher aequitas).

As in his first book on the theology of Barth (under the title: "Karl Barth," 1936, available only in Dutch), Berkouwer has sought for the central theme that dominates Barth's thinking. In 1936 he mentioned as such the idea of the absolute sovereignty of God; in the present volume he calls it "the triumph of grace." In my opinion Berkouwer directs the arrow to the centre here. This indeed characterises the whole Barthian theology. Actually the book consists of two parts. The first part gives an extensive and thorough analysis: the second part is more critical and subjects the views under consideration to the tests of Scripture. After having pointed out Barth's continuing significance (chap. 1) Berkouwer brings us to the heart of Barth's theology by asking such a question: Is this theology no more than a theology of crisis? It cannot be denied that, especially in the beginning, the crisis motif had a very central place in Barth's thinking. However, this crisis motive was neither the only nor even the main motif. Berkouwer shows very clearly that already in

the *Romerbrief* Barth's intention was to speak the No for the sake of making the divine Yes heard. Barth was concerned about the triumph of the grace of God, as clearly appears also from his sermons of this period. And this motif of the triumph of grace has become more and more central; it is even the dominating feature of all Barth's theologising.

In the Chapters III-VII Berkouwer points this out in five points. Unfortunately it must suffice to mention them only here, because an extensive rendering would take too much space. They are, the triumph of grace in creation (in connection with this Berkouwer gives a thorough analysis of the chaos, "das Nichtige," one of the most difficult points of Barth's dogmatics), the triumph of election, the triumph of reconciliation (God places "Himself" under judgment and bears the curse of death), the eschatological triumph (death as sign of judgment and death as natural end), and the triumph of grace in its antithesis to Rome (*analogia entis* problem!).

In the second part of the book Berkouwer proceeds to discuss and criticise the analysed views. He does so along four lines: (1) The nature of this triumph (Ch. IX). Here he especially deals with the question: "Over which darkness does the light of God's grace triumph?" Here the concept "chaos" (*das Nichtige*) comes up again. Berkouwer criticises it severely by indicating that the Scriptures speak of "what God is not" in a wholly different way and on a wholly different level. In this same connection he also attacks Barth's speaking of the ontological impossibility of sin, his too short treatise on the demons, his distinction of the work of God's left hand and that of God's right hand (used by Barth in a way totally different from that of Luther) and his rejection of the historical order creation-fall-redemption. (2) The universality of the triumph (Ch. X). Here Berkouwer focuses his critical attention to Barth's doctrine of election and rightly he directs his attack against the weak point in Barth's view, viz., "the tension between God's universal election and the human answer, particularly when this answer is the answer of unbelief" (262). Barth himself speaks of the ontological impossibility of unbelief, but is it legitimate to say that? Berkouwer answers this question in the negative. Of particular interest is the comparison of Barth and Calvin here. (3) The divine triumph (Ch. XI). Here Berkouwer investigates the legitimacy of the triumph of reconciliation. Barth speaks here of Jesus as "the reconciling God Himself" and in connection with this of the suffering of God, His obedience and His self-surrender. Rightly Berkouwer calls this a form of theopaschitism and holds that Barth has no answer to the suggestion that there is a conflict within God, though he rejects it emphatically. In this same chapter Berkouwer deals further with Barth's conception of omnipotence, his view on the *status duplex* of Christ, and, as a striking example of Barth's whole doctrine, he discusses his view on the relationship between gospel and law. (4) In Ch. XII is given a short examination of the triumph of the end, which in this Barthian form is wholly rejected. Over against Barth's eternalising of this our ending life Berkouwer maintains the scriptural ideal of the continuity (Cf. Matt. 22:23f.).

As it has become clear, this volume provides such a wealth of theology that it might appear presumptuous to offer criticism. Suffice it to make two remarks. In the first place; the title is a little deceptive. For it more or less suggests Berkouwer's approval and agreement, which is not the case. Therefore it would have been more

correct to put the words "the triumph of grace" between quotation marks in the title. And secondly, it is to be regretted that Berkouwer left out the doctrine of revelation and of the Scriptures. For here we find the same motif, yes here we find the basis of Barth's whole dogmatics. The same applies to the doctrine of God. In Barth's treatment of the divine perfections the decision on all the other *loci* has been taken already.

However, all these things are only minor points. Let us be grateful for such guidance as we receive in this study. I think it is of great importance, in our English-speaking world in particular. In his foreword to the introductory report on his Church Dogmatics by Professor Otto Weber (Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, 1953, translated by Arthur C. Cochrane) Barth himself complains: "Am I deceived when I have the impression that I exist in the phantasy of far too many — even of the best — mainly, only in the form of certain, for the most part, hoary summations; of certain pictures hastily dashed off by some person at some time, and for the sake of convenience, just as hastily accepted, and then copied endlessly, and which, of course, can easily be dismissed? However, I could hardly recognise in them anything else than my own ghost! . . . All in all: 'neo-orthodoxy' with a faint flavour of nihilism! What else? Should I weep or laugh? Is this the only way in which I am known in the English-speaking theological world in spite of all the translations that have appeared so far?" I think Berkouwer's book can be a great help to change this situation. It is a very good thing that the Church Dogmatics itself is being translated at the moment, but those who cannot spare the time (nor the expense) to read (and buy) these volumes, will receive trustworthy information from Berkouwer.

Kl. Runia.

THE MOMENT BEFORE GOD

By Martin J. Heinecken (Muhlenberg Press, Philadelphia), 1956, pp. 386; $5.95.

This is an important addition to the rapidly growing library of books devoted to the life and thought of Soren Kierkegaard. The author, however, does not recapitulate once again the unhappy and intricate story of Kierkegaard's life: he attempts to explicate certain dominant emphases in his thought. In particular, he discusses Kierkegaard's analysis of the Christian life: his interpretation of guilt, despair, suffering, and faith. He seeks to correct certain current misrepresentations and distortions, by clarifying the real significance of the paradoxes in which Kierkegaard delights. No one can fail to find this discussion helpful and illuminating.

The author's style is vivid and arresting. It is interesting to read of the "pesky" pragmatists (p. 2), the "prissy" virtues (p. 9), to know that Kierkegaard wanted no "lickspittle" apology (p. 56), that man can "hob-nob" with God (p. 75), and that unregenerate man suffers from the weird "goose-pimples" of nameless dread (p. 165). These unusual colloquialisms do not detract from the general excellence of the presentation. The following comment is revealing: "Norman Vincent Peale, with his summaries of case histories that pass for Christian sermons, would most certainly be a prime example of the utter confusion of the categories which Kierkegaard has in mind" (p. 309).

Interest is added to this work by the fact that the author was formerly on the staff of Immanuel College, Adelaide.

A word is missing from the sentence beginning, "Kierkegaard insisted . . ." on p. 118; and the "e" is missing from the word "one" on p. 298.

This book is a delight to the eyes: the binding, printing and paper are first class.

S. BARTON BABBAGE.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE CHURCH. From Archbishop Whitgift to the Long Parliament.
By Christopher Hill (Oxford University Press, London), 1956, 366 pp.; 68/- (Aust.).

It was in the year 1576 that Bodin published *Les Six Livres de la Republique,* in which he argued that the driving forces behind the Reformation were economic and political rather than religious. This is a contention which has been often repeated—and not only by Marx. The inter-relation is not in dispute; the subject of controversy is the causal nature of the links. Tawney discussed the connexion in his classic works *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.* Christopher Hill, in *Economic Problems of the Church,* is concerned to demonstrate the same interconnexion, but in this case between puritanism in particular rather than religion in general.

The author points out the magnitude of the economic problem which confronted the leaders of the post-Reformation Church. The Reformation involved a vast secularisation of Church property. The plunder continued in Elizabeth's reign by means of long leases, of exchanges, of outright seizures. One of Archbishop Parker's last acts was to write to Elizabeth with some vehemence against the plunder of the Church. The problem of augmenting clerical stipends in a day of rising prices was one of acute difficulty. Concerning the state of the clergy, a contemporary, Sir Thomas Wilson, observed: "To say the truth, their wings are well clipped of late, by courtiers and noblemen, and some quite cutaway, both feather, flesh, and bone." The author of this work brings out well the effect of the Reformation on the attitude and thought of the laity. The heirachy was weakened economically and its social prestige was lowered by the unrestrained spoilation of the Church, with the consequence that its members became increasingly dependent on the favour of the Court. "He had need to be a bold man," said the royalist Jeremy Taylor, "that shall tell his patron he is going to hell."

The puritans were loud in their condemnation of the abuse of pluralities. The ecclesiastical authorities argued that pluralities were an inescapable evil, if ability was to be rightly rewarded. The Puritan solution to the poverty of the clergy was the abolition of episcopacy. The payment of tithes was also a perennial subject of controversy. The Puritans objected to tithes as a relic of popery, and desired their abolition. Milton speaks contemptuously of "the ignoble huckSterage of piddling titches." The rising middle class were also opposed to tithes on economic grounds, and adopted the view that ministers should be chosen and paid by congregations. They urged that a basis of voluntary contract should be substituted for that of patronage. The problem was accentuated by the fact that the endowments of parishes had been largely diverted into the pockets of landlords and farmers, who were known as impropriators. There are circumstantial reports of decayed and deliberately destroyed Churches in impropriate parishes.

The House of Commons was filled with a righteous zeal for the establishment of a preaching ministry, but not at the cost of restoring

property alienated at the Reformation. Mary had found insuperable opposition to the restoration of monastic lands; and the hierachy found a like opposition to the restoration of impropriations and endowments. The clergy, for their part, complained that they got "leavings not livings." A drastic economic reorganisation might have saved the situation, but this is just what the hierachy were unable to achieve. The solutions proposed by Laud were entirely conservative, and in the light of a changing social order, reactionary. The Reformation had profound social and economic consequences as well as theological; and the century successive to the Reformation was faced with the delicate and difficult problems of inevitable readjustment. Laud was lacking in elasticity of mind, and the tragedy is that he was unable to devise new methods for a new age.

This suggestive and scholarly book is a mine of historical information. It shows the foolishness of departmentalising history; whether history be labelled ecclesiastical, or economic, or political, or social. This book is a brilliant illustration of the fact that theology does not exist *in vacuo*.

S. BARTON BABBAGE.

DER CHRISTLICHE EXISTENZIALISMUS GABRIEL MARCELS By Friedrich Hoefeld (Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich,), 1956, pp. 174 Fr. 14.

The author has set himself a difficult task, i.e., to offer a systematic account of an unsystematic thinker. Gabriel Marcel's thought is not only fragmentary in form, but also in substance. A comparison with Pascal suggests itself, but fragmentary as Pascal's *Thoughts* are in form, the substance of his argument stands out in impressive clarity. By way of contrast, Marcel's trend of argument remains elusive. Whatever subject Hoefeld happens to take up, he very soon reaches a point where he is forced to admit that Marcel has broken off the pursuit of his own ideas and suggestions at a vital point.

It might be advanced in Marcel's defence that the very nature of the task he has set himself demands this kind of fragmentary treatment. It might be pointed out that his philosophical contribution is in the nature of a corrective rather than a fully reasoned statement: that Marcel has set out to show up the inefficiencies of discursive reasoning rather than add another example of it. Such pleading is not without its justification, for Marcel's contribution does, in fact, lie in his insistent pointing to the "leakage" that is involved in all abstract communication of reality. But in his attempt to preserve the immediacy of experience, Marcel tends to forget the Kantian lesson that perceptions without concepts are blind, that experience without the interpretation of discursive reason amounts to the elimination of all experience in the full human sense. In this respect Marcel might have learnt well from Sartre, who is singularly clear on the point that we live at a distance from ourselves.

It would certainly have helped Marcel to communicate his own ideas if his language had had something of a Sartrian quality or of Pascal's for that matter. Marcel's language is singularly lacking in those memorable phrases in which Pascal and Sartre are so fertile. In a writer who prefers to leave his thought fragmentary, the use of the suggestive, concise, pointed statement would have been a definite advantage.

Hoefeld has done us a great service by bringing some order into Marcel's though. We have here a patient but by no means uncritical guide to a maze of material that, without such a help, might easily fail to yield its treasure.

H. H. REX.

THE SIEGE PERILOUS

By S. H. Hooke (S.C.M., London), 1956, pp. 264; 21/-.

Here is a book in which the reader is enabled to see through the work of one man, how scholarly opinion has changed in regard to a number of biblical questions during the years 1931 to 1954. Essays and addresses prepared by Professor S. H. Hooke for a wide range of publications and audiences are here collected into one volume. They are presented in their original form. Earlier essays compared with later ones show changes in emphasis. A few foot notes indicate changed viewpoints, as for example, that on p. 115 — "I no longer regard the Servant pasages as by a different author from that of the rest of Deutero-Isaiah," or an alteration of the date of Hammurabi to about 1750 B.C. (p. 171). Not all the nineteen essays are concerned with the author's major interest, which was that of seeking to discover whether there was a common ritual mythology shared by peoples in the Ancient Near East. Two essays for example, give a review of archaeology and its value for the Old Testament. Another discusses the early history of Writing. Some of the essays are concerned to show the relation of Christianity to Judaism. One deals with Christianity and the Mystery Religions.

On the general theme of myth and ritual, Old Testament parallels with the Gilgamesh story are expounded, the ancient theory of substitution is examined, especially the substitution of someone in place of the king, the Cain and Abel story is seen as a ritual murder to promote fertility, and a discussion of the mixture of Cults in Canaan is undertaken. There are in addition some more general essays touching on myth, ritual and history. It is evident that the author wants to view the Israelite forms of worship against the background of Egyptian and Mesopotamian ritual patterns. One has the feeling that he does not sufficiently acknowledge the uniqueness of Israel's faith. It is widely recognised to-day that Moses was the great focal-point of Israel's first clear formulation of cultic and civil law. No doubt Professor Hooke would not hold to-day to all he has written in the past. Yet it is clear that superficial resemblances between Israel's rituals and those of her neighbours are no measure of the inner faith of Israel. We should be more impressed by the differences, than by the resemblances.

Two of the essays deal with specific biblical topics — the corner-stone of Scripture, and the sign of Immanuel. The first of these analyses all passages referring to the corner-stone. Of these, only the ones in Zechariah 3 and 4 are allowed to have Messianic significance. In some of the others the stone is held to be a symbol of Israel. The discussion of the sign of Immanuel is set in the background of the prophetic use of signs, and shows how an interpretation of the sign of Israel's day was expanded and given significance in the New Testament.

One could wish that the author had provided an index, since there is a good deal of repetition of ideas. The book will be of value to the scholar, but may be confusing to those who are not experts.

J. A. THOMPSON.

THE FAITH OF ISRAEL: ASPECTS OF OLD TESTAMENT THOUGHT

By H. H. Rowley (S.C.M. Press, London), 1956, 220 pages; 18/- sterling.

This is a fine, good, useful book on the Theology of the Old Testament. It consists of seven lectures given in the U.S.A., in 1955, on the

following subjects: Revelation and its Media, the Nature of God, the Nature and Need of Man, Individual and Community, the Good Life, Death and Beyond, the Day of the Lord. In the nature of the case it is a summary book, but it is not at all a text-book; each of the subjects is handled theologically, and from time to time the religious aspect comes out strongly, as when he is speaking of the psalms as illustrating the way in which the Good Life is grounded in worship. Needless to say, it is a book that shows great learning, for Dr. Rowley has read everything, and there is the usual careful list of footnote references on every page; but it is also a book of great wisdom. In the lecture on the Revelation of God, there is an illuminating discussion on the reality of the divine action as shown in the collocation of the prophetic word and the event, as in the Exodus-story (which must be seen as beginning with the Call of Moses), in the defeat of Sisera, in the deliverance of Jerusalem from Sennacherib; there is "the prophetic anticipation, and the subsequent fulfilment in history that the prophet himself was powerless to effect by any human means." In the N.T. the same is seen in our Lord's predictions of His passion and His saving death (pp. 40-46). With regard to miracles, he says: "It is sometimes alleged that critical scholarship is based on the denial of the possibility of miracle. Let me say with clarity and candour that I neither begin nor end with any such denial. If miracle be defined as divine activity, within the world, a belief in its possibility would seem to be fundamental to a belief in God." The O.T. does indeed speak of divine activity through natural events, as in the defeat of Sisera, and through events contrary to the order of nature, as in the recovery of an axe-head from a river by Elisha. "The miracle stories can neither be uncritically accepted as historical, nor uncritically rejected as fancy. Each example must be examined for itself, in the light of the character of the narrative in which it stands and the purpose for which it appears to have been written. But that there is a truly miraculous element in the story I am full persuaded." (pp. 57-58).

GABRIEL HEBERT, S.S.M.

THE GENERAL EPISTLE OF JAMES: AN INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY
By R. V. G. Tasker (Tyndale Press, London), 1956, pp. 144; 7/6.

THE EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE THESSALONIANS: AN INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY
By Leon Morris (Tyndale Press, London), 1956, pp. 152; 7/6.

This new series of Tyndale New Testament Commentaries has R. V. G. Tasker (Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University of London) as General Editor, and aims to be "primarily exegetical and only secondarily homiletic." Certainly, a surprising amount of exegetical material is compressed into the first two of the series, and both are highly competent and well-disciplined examples of this kind of commentary writing. Professor Tasker's volume is perhaps a little warmer in tone and broader in exposition than Dr. Morris's; but that may be because he quotes so much of Calvin! Both writers are conservative in general, and in particular, Dr. Morris especially declining to be drawn into discussion of theories which go beyond the scope of pure exegesis.

Tasker takes James to be the brother of the Lord, and the date of the epistle to be about 60 A.D. It is addressed to various congrega-

tions of Christians which together "constitute the people of God who are continuous with the old Israel but consist of all, regardless of their nationality, who acknowledge Jesus as God's Messiah." The discussion of justification is very fine, and passages such as 5:13-18 are treated with care and good judgment, though the reviewer doubts if Tasker is right in considering this sort of healing as "that *miraculous* healing which was no infrequent occurrence in the apostolic age, and is regarded in the New Testament as a supernatural sign vindicating the truth of the Christian Gospel in the early days of its proclamation."

Dr. Morris is a very cautious exegete, and his summary discourses on many Greek words (transliterated, for the commentary is based on the Authorised Version) are one of the best features of his work. The reviewer, however, would offer the following minor suggestions: "Our gospel," in 1 Thess. 1:5 surely means "the gospel we preached" (pp. 37 and 43); "to fill up their sins always" in 1 Thess. 2:16 (p. 56) expresses result, not purpose (so Burton); a better case for *"pistis"* meaning "faithfulness" can be made out than Dr. Morris allows (p. 64 and p. 141), and 2 Thess. 1:4 as well as 3:2 ("Not all men can be trusted") are good examples (there are cases elsewhere in the N.T.); on p.84, "them who are falling asleep" should surely be "them who are sleeping," and on p. 85, 'them that sleep through Jesus" should be "them that slept" *(tous koimethentas);* one would like some explanation of the unparalleled use of "wake or sleep" in 1 Thess. 5:10 to mean "live or die" (p. 97); does not the use of *heatou* in 1 Thess. 4:4, together with the content of v.6, make it practically certain that "vessel" means "wife" (p. 76)? Is there any real ground for taking *hoitines* in 2 Thess. 1:9 as a relative of quality, in view of Cadburys' discussion of relatives in the N.T.? On more weighty matters one would have appreciated some comment on the significance of Paul's application of the term "apostles' 'to those who accompanied him on his missionary journeys (p. 47); and the discussion of the eschatological passage in 2 Thess. 2 is disappointing, especially in reference to "the day of the Lord," and the "man of lawlessness." Dr. Morris minimises the connection between Daniel's prophecies and Thessalonians, and gives little help towards the understanding of principles of interpretation of biblical prophecy.

We look forward to more such scholarly volumes in this series. They are well printed and pleasant to handle.

D. W. B. ROBINSON

KINGDOM AND THE CHURCH: A STUDY IN THE THEOLOGY OF THE REFORMATION

By T. F. Torrance (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London), 1956, pp. 168; 16/-.

This thought-provoking book presents in a comparatively small space a wealth of historical information, illuminated by the systematising power of a great dogmatician. It deals with the teaching of Luther, Butzer (this correct speling of the name is applied) and Calvin on "Kingdom and Church," showing the indissoluble connection between ecclesiology and eschatology, which characterises the theology of the Reformers in contrast with Rome. The chapter on Luther whose doctrine is characterised as "eschatology of faith," gives a fair and comprehensive presentation of just those points of his theology which were not so well understood on the British Isles until scholars like G. Rupp inaugurated the British version of the "Luther renaissance." The attention of the reader is especially called to what Professor

Torrance has to say about the eschatological dialectic of *justus et peccator*—the very key to Luther's theology—and about the much-debated doctrine on the "two kingdoms." More emphasis should have been placed on Luther's understanding of history and on the meaning of his doctrine on Antichrist. The brief chapter on Butzer and his "eschatology of love" cannot be more than an introduction into the problems of Butzer's concept of the *Regnum Christi*. The observations of the author are illustrated and corroborated by the discovery of the far-reaching influence which the Reformer of Strassburg has exercised not only on Puritanism in England, but via England again on European Pietism. The investigation of Butzer's ecclesiola and its program at Strassburg by W. Bellardi (*Quellen und Texte zur Reformationsgeschichte*, vol. XVIII, 1934), and the last work by the late Professor of Reformed Theology at Halle, August Lang (*Puritanismus und Pietsmus*, 1941) have shed a new light on this man, who came into his own when Pietism and Methodism defeated the theology of Luther and Calvin. The chapter on Calvin and his "eschatology of hope" is full of most valuable information on this Reformer whose theology was broader and more complex than the classical Calvanistic orthodoxy would make us believe. It has, however, to be asked whether the sudden change which has obviously taken place with regard to the interpretation of Calvin's doctrine on predestination is not due rather to a change of mind on the part of modern Reformed Christendom than to a discovery of the real theology of Calvin by modern historians. Karl Barth's biting remarks on what he calls "Neocalvinism" (see the interesting report on the discussion of predestination since 1936 in *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, vol. 11/2, p. 207ff.) suggest to him who thus far took Calvin's statements at their face value that Calvin would take the side of the "Neocalvinists." Are we not all, Lutherans as well as Reformed, in the great danger of selecting from our Reformers that which appeals to us and calling this their true theology? This is most certainly true of historians and dogmaticians in present day Lutheranism, especially with regard to the doctrine on the Sacrament of the Altar. But probably it is true of all theologians, theology being a *scientia practica* which cannot be separated from our lives and from the life of the Church. This, then, explains also the ethos and pathos of this book, which aims at a closer understanding of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches and at the achievement of that unity which was unattainable in the 16th century. This deepest interest of Professor Torrance's book becomes evident not only in the entire setup—for there can be no separation between faith, love, and hope—but in a special way in his dealing with the problem of the sacraments. We cannot enter into a discussion of this problem here. Suffice it to say that his interpretation of Luther's doctrine on the real Presence is historically untenable, though many Lutherans today would accept it. Luther and the Lutheran Church have always rejected consubstantiation—the contrary opinion is due to a misunderstanding of a passage in "De Captivitate Babylonica." Even the medieval terms "in," "with," and "under" are not characteristic of the Lutheran doctrine. Strictly speaking, there is no specific Lutheran doctrine on the Real Presence. Luther demanded nothing but the acceptance of the literal meaning of the 'est." Calvin could never accept that, as on the other hand the Lutherans could never accept as biblical Calvin's doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the "transporteur" who brings he body and blood of Christ to our souls, and his interpretation of the *Sursum corda*. In this respect the learned author, despite all attempts to do justice to both Reformers, has not been able to give more than a

formulation of a problem which, as it has occupied the greatest minds of the 16th century, seems to become again a central issue of modern theology. Professor Torrance may be assured that his voice will be attentively heard by all who take part in these discussions.

H. SASSE.

SHORTER NOTICES

The High Church Party, 1688-1718, by George Every, S.S.M. (Church Historical Society, S.P.C.K., London; 30/-). This is an able piece of historical research devoted to a discussion of the antecedents and origin of the High Church Party. The so-called Low Party was the party of the Latitudinarians, who desired to facilitate a *rapprochement* with Protestants generally. The High Church Party, by contrast, who were known as Altitudinarians, desired to exalt episcopacy and the practices of the primitive church. These subjects are explored in relation to the Revolution of 1689, the creation of the Non-Jurors' schism, and the meetings of Convocation. The author points out that the Evangelical Party was an offshoot of the High Church Party: it is erroneous to equate "Low Church" with "Evangelical." This work is marked by careful scholarship and original research. It usefully fills a gap in our knowledge of the seventeenth century. The illustrations (taken from contemporary prints) are admirable and arresting.

S. Barton Babbage.

Die Politischen Voraussagen der Propheten, by Dr. Ernst Jenni Zwingli, Zurich). This is the latest in the series of theological monographs appearing under the editorship of Professors Eichrodt and Cullman of Switzerland. Dr. Jenni begins by pointing out that in the recent past the idea that the great O.T. prophets could on occasions actually foretell future political events has been largely discounted. That day is now past, however, as is the suggestion that the prophets were not inspired. Thus when Jeremiah foretold the death of Hananiah "within a year" (Jer. 28:16), many expositors have regarded the fulfilment of the prophecy as a *vaticinium ex eventu*. On the other hand, most of the prophetic utterances refer to an eschatological future, since they are usually prefaced with such words as "on that day," and combine within them the great themes of judgment and salvation. There follows therefore a thorough examination of all the "foretellings" of each of the prophets in turn. Some passages evidently refer to definite political events, and certain of them are fulfilled at dateable moments. A few, however, remain unfulfilled. Another group of prophecies, again, Jenni collects together under the heading of "realised eschatology." Both the triumphant return passages in Deutero-Isaiah and the prophetic utterances of Haggai and Zechariah about Zerubbabel he puts in this category. The final chapter draws the conclusion that the prophetic "political" foretellings cannot be unified under one umbrella. Jenni actually finds eight classes of such prophetic utterances. This is a careful and interesting study.

Early Israel in Recent History Writing, by John Bright, Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 19 (S.C.M., 7/6). The many difficulties facing the historian of the Old Testament in the pre-monarchical period are well known. Professor Bright, who has already given us "The Kingdom of God in Bible and Church," a biblical history that outlines the on-going purpose of God through Israel's story, now seeks in this

monograph to assess the work of three historians who have tackled the early period. Two of these are little known here, as their works are in German—Martin Noth, and Albrecht Alt, but one of Y. Kaufman's works (the third historian to be discussed) has been translated from Hebrew into English. The two Germans are extreme sceptics on the early period; e.g., Noth regards Joshua 1-9 as merely a row of aetiological tales. Noth bases himself on the methods of the classical documentary criticism rigorously carried out. He ends by reducing Moses to the merest shadow of a legend. Kaufman, Bright tells us, has taken issue with such a critical position. He establishes the validity of the biblical account by a novel literary criticism which has the effect of moving its composition back very close to the events it describes. However, Bright does not believe that Kaufman has succeeded in his correction of the Germans. Therefore he proceeds to analyse very acutely the whole argument from aetiology. By paralleling M. Noth's form of argument with arguments that could be applied to historical characters well known to his American readers, Bright shows how legends could have arisen round famous men. A modern historian, if he were to follow Noth's form of reasoning, might dismiss as legendary even the great figure of Washington! Bright, I believe, is working at the moment on a new history of Israel. This little book will do much to assure us that his method is sound, and that his coming volume will be helpful indeed.

G. A. F. Knight.

Saint Peter, by John Lowe (Oxford, 17/6 Aust.). Evidence from the New Testament and other early Christian sources for our knowledge of St. Peter has been sorely mishandled to support exaggerated papal claims and non-Roman counter-claims. These three lectures aim to present an impartial appraisal of the material relating to St. Peter, literary, liturgical, archaeological. The first lecture deals with Peter's position in the Church of the New Testament; the second, with the question of Peter's martyrdom and association with Rome; and the third, with the claims for the primacy of Peter. The account is brief, but surprisingly full, and presents a much more balanced picture of the Apostle than we are generally given. More's the pity that the Australian price is so high for this very slender volume of 65 well-spaced pages.

Principalities and Powers, by G. B. Caird (Oxford, 25/- Aust.). After a long neglect there is a growing interest in the spiritual background of the New Testament; and here is a study of that aspect of Paul's thought wherein constantly appears the idea of sinister powers forming as it were a spiritual underworld. Paul, it is affirmed, is using mythological language to describe spiritual experiences that were very real to him and his readers. The study aims at elucidating these experiences. It examines Jewish and Christian attitudes to the authority of the state and pagan religion. It considers the demonic forces of legalism, "the tyranny of the law." It discusses biblical ideas regarding the irrational factor in the world of nature. And, finally, it expounds Paul's view that Christ has vanquished the demonic agencies. Because the author's task is mainly descriptive, with scripture being used as its own best interpreter, some questions are inevitably deferred to the philosopher and the systematic theologian. To say this is in no wise to detract from a valuable contribution to the understanding of St. Paul's mind.

The Bright Cloud, by J. R. McPhail (Oxford, 25/- Aust.). The subtitle of this book, "The Bible in the Light of the Transfiguration," is apt to raise expectations that are not realised, as there is not the sustained relation to the Transfiguration which it suggests, and, besides, the touchstone of the Transfiguration is sometimes questionably applied. More apposite as an indication of the author's approach might have been the sentence from Jeremy Taylor (given on p. 17), whence the book obtains its title. Mr. MacPhail takes what he justifiably calls a fresh look at the Bible. Of course he does not attempt to cover it all, but dwells in detail upon important features. After an introductory section on the Incarnation, attention is given first to Acts and some of Paul's letters, then to certain background themes of the Old Testament, and finally to the four Gospels. Marked by a readable style, and freely interspersed with phrases and passages of illuminating freshness, the brief survey has much to commend it to those people "who want more theology, even if they do not care for the name."

C. S. Petrie.

Reformed Dogmatics, by Klaas Runia (Association for Higher Education on a Calvinistic Basis, 90 Noble Street, Geelong, Victoria). This embodies the inaugural lecture of the Professor of Systematic Theology at the recently established Australian Reformed Theological College. Dr. Runia sets forth the essence of Reformed Dogmatics as the recognition of the absolute theonomy made known in the Scriptures through the witness of the Holy Spirit, whilst its method must be Scriptural, Church-confessional and theocentric. His Church Confession binds the dogmatician not as the *norma normans* but *norma normata* and hence is to be viewed not as a set of prison walls but rather "as an authoritative map which will direct him into the wide roomy landscape of Scriptural revelation. He must consult it; he has to follow its directions. But he himself does the travelling." The theocentric aspect of methodology is defined as Trinitarian from which position the Christocentric approach of Barth is rejected. Here is an able and lucid statement from a young theologian who stands within the vigorous Kuyper-Bavinck tradition of Dutch Calvinism.

The Pattern of Authority, by Bernard Ramm, and *All Ye That Labor*, by Lester De Koster (Eerdmans, $1.50). These are the opening volumes of the "Pathway Books," a series of semi-popular evangelical apologetics to which, among others, our esteemed editorial colleague is listed as contributor. In the first, the writer, assuming the Augustinian thesis that revelation and authority are correlates, from the position that "the Scriptures are authoritative in all that they *intend* to teach," critically examines the Roman, Modernist, Kergymatic, and Neo-Orthodox positions. Concerning Barth's *Church Dogmatics*, he writes: "Surely there is an undigested something here for the denial of propositional revelation hardly accords with a 6,000,000-word report on it!" The second book provides a thoughtful and suggestive essay which attempts "to examine Marxism as an explanation of and proposed cure for human evil, in the light of the Christian understanding of sin and salvation." These opening volumes promise a series of value to minister and layman alike.

What Presbyterians Believe, by Gordon H. Clark (Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, Philadelphia). This practical exposition of the Westminster Confession of Faith aims to show the relevance of its concepts in the twentieth century. The writing is lucid and pointed and provides a valuable basis for study and discussion.

R. Swanton

Book Reviews

Page

BERKOUWER, G. C.: The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth 53
By the Rev. Professor Klaas Runia, Th.D., Reformed Theological College, Geelong, Vic.

HEINECKEN, MARTIN J.: The Moment Before God 55
By the Very Rev. Principal S. Barton Babbage, M.A., Ph.D., Th.D., Ridley College, Melbourne.

HILL, CHRISTOPHER: Economic Problems of the Church .. 56
By the Very Rev. Principal S. Barton Babbage.

HOEFELD, FRIEDRICH: Der Christliche Existentialismus Gabriel Marcels 57
By the Rev. Professor H. H. Rex, M.A., D.Theol., Knox College, University of Otago.

HOOKE, S. H.: The Seige Perilous 58
By J. A. Thompson, M.A., M.Sc., B.D., Baptist College, Sydney.

ROWLEY, H. H.: The Faith of Israel: Aspects of Old Testament Thought 58
By the Rev. A. G. Hebert, M.A., D.D., S.S.M., St. Michael's House, Crafers, S.A.

TASKER, R. V. G.: The General Epistle of James 59
By the Rev. D. W. B. Robinson, M.A., Moore College, Sydney.

MORRIS, LEON: The Epistle of Paul to the Thessalonians .. 59
By the Rev. D. W. B. Robinson.

TORRANCE, T. F.: Kingdom and the Church 60
By the Rev. Professor Hermann Sasse, D.Theol., Immanuel Theological Seminary, Adelaide.

SHORTER NOTICES 62

W. D. VAUGHAN PTY. LTD. Print, 126-128 Denmark Street, Kew, E.4

AUG 1 1957